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Introduction
In a recent study, Oyer (2004) points out that much of the agency literature has concentrated on inducing optimal effort while little attention has been paid to the participation constraint. As a result, there exists some inconsistencies between the theoretical prediction of a typical principalagent model and the observed compensation practice. For example, the pay to CEOs has increased steadily in the past three decades, despite the sentiment that CEOs are over compensated for firms' performance which are largely due to the economic booming. The base salaries and bonuses of Forbes 800 CEOs, excluding the executive stock options, increased from an average of $700,000 to more than $2.2 million, measured in 2000 constant dollars (see Murphy 2002, 2003) .
The second inconsistency is with respect to the empirically observed relationship between the pay-to-performance sensitivity (hereafter PPS) and a firm's total risk. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) confirms the negative prediction between PPS and a firm's total risk while Core and Guay (1999) documents a positive relationship between the PPS and a firm's idiosyncratic risk.
The positive relationship is also supported by the evidence in Oyer and Shaefer (2005) for option grants. 1 These two inconsistencies on executive compensation practice suggest that other factors beyond the effort-insurance trade-off, such as ensuring the participation constraint, may play important roles when firms design their compensation policies.
To reconcile with these two stylized facts, this paper develops a dynamic labor search equilibrium model to study the optimal incentive contract. In this model, firms compete for CEOs and CEOs quit if they are not satisfied with the incentive contracts. Therefore, we can explicitly determine the conditions under which the participation constraint is satisfied. Further, we can examine the effects of the participation constraint on the incentive contract. Specifically, we construct a dynamic equilibrium model in which many firms and CEOs search for matches. In each period, a firm offers a compensation package, which consists of salary plus incentive payments based on the profit sharing ratio. Then a match-specific shock occurs which is observable only by the firm's CEO. After observing the shock, the CEO decides whether to accept the offer. The CEO quits only if his outside option exceeds the utility he can derive from the current compensation scheme. After his decision, an economy-wide shock occurs. The CEO chooses the effort level if he stays with the firm. The firm's output depends on the match-specific shock, the aggregate shock, and the effort. Since only output is observable and so contracts can only be contingent on output.
The value of a job that a CEO can find in the marketplace is determined by other firms' compensation schemes. Thus, a CEO's reservation utility is endogenously determined in equilibrium.
Also, since it is costly to maintain a vacant position, a firm would offer a contract that retains the CEO under "normal" circumstances. The contract offered by one firm depends on other firms' contracts through the CEO's outside options. Because of this link among different firms'
contracts, an equilibrium must determine all firms' contracts together. We focus on a stationary and symmetric equilibrium where all firms offer the same type of contracts.
The equilibrium analysis yields a few new and important results which can explain the two inconsistencies discussed earlier. In particular, 1) the equilibrium salary increases with the size of the firm, which, in turn, increases with the expected aggregate state. The predicted relationship between the salary and the firm size (or the aggregate state) provides a plausible explanation to the first inconsistency. Specifically, the recent increase in executive pay may be an efficient equilibrium response to the increase in the firm size, and the steady increase in executives' salary may be a result of competition for CEOs among firms during the economic booming in the past three decades.
2) The equilibrium profit-sharing ratio (or PPS) negatively depends on the expected aggregate state and firms' systematic risks, and positively on firms' specific (match) risks. The separate effects of firms' systematic and specific risks on the PPS, offers a possible theory to reconcile with the mixed evidence on the empirical relationship between PPS and firms' total risk, the second inconsistency discussed earlier. This result is in sharp contrast to a simple negative relationship between the PPS and firms' total risks predicted by a standard principal-agent model.
3) Firms use the total compensation as incentives to retain/attract CEOs, in response to their endogenous reservation utilities while using the profit sharing payment as incentives to induce effort. Salary acts as an insurance to effort-averse CEOs while the profit-sharing payment may change with the aggregate state from time to time. This flexible profit sharing provides a costefficient way to achieve the desirable retention over time. 4) The percentage of the total pay to induce effort decreases with the expected aggregate state and the firm's systematic risk, and increases with the firm's idiosyncratic risk. 5) The equilibrium retention probability and job duration are positively affected by the firm's systematic risk and the expected aggregate state, and negatively affected by the firm's specific risk.
Further, we conduct empirical analysis to validate these theoretical predictions. Our focus is on the impacts of the aggregate state, firms' systematic and specific risks on compensation policies and CEOs' participation and job duration. Specifically, we use the GDP growth or the commercial paper spread to represent the aggregate state. Firms' risks can be proxied by their stock return volatilities or dollar risks (which are equal to return volatilities multiplied by firms' capitalizations). Our empirical analysis strongly support the following predictions. 1) Salary together with bonus and long-term incentive pay positively depends on the firm size as well as the aggregate state; 2) PPS negatively depends on the aggregate state and firms' systematic risks, positively on firms' specific risks; 3) The percentage of total pay used to induce effort is negatively influenced by the aggregate state and firms' systematic risk, positively by firms' specific risks.
Our paper contributes to the agency literature in three dimensions. First, we explicitly model CEOs' quitting decision and study the incentive contracts which induce both the effort and retention. Second, we endogenously determine how the aggregate state affects the reservation utility of a CEO. Third, we analyze the optimal compensation contract in a dynamic setting where firms strategically interact in the CEO job market. This is in contrast to a typical principal-agent model which analyzes the optimal compensation contract for a single firm in a static setting. In addition to the above mentioned contributions to the agency literature, this paper also contributes to the labor search literature (e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides 1994) by introducing effort-inducing mechanism into the compensation contract. By doing so, our equilibrium analysis generates a few new insights which not only can jointly explain the two puzzles related to executive compensation practice, but also can provide important implications on executive compensation design with 3 respect to the aggregate environment and firms' systematic v.s. non-systematic risks. This paper shares with Oyer (2004) by recognizing the importance of ensuring participation constraint. Oyer (2004) is an important first step to analyze the effect of ensuring the participation constraint on compensation contracts. The focus of Oyer's study is on low-ranked employees, not on CEOs as we do. Because the broad-based compensation offers little incentive to low-ranked employees, Oyer doesn't model the effort-inducing incentive mechanism in his analysis. Also, he assumes an exogenous reservation utility which is correlated with the firm's performance.
Clearly, his set-up is well suited for low-ranked employees. However, given our focus on CEOs, it is necessary to ensure both the effort-inducing and the participation constraint. Moreover, we explicitly model multi-firms and CEOs and their interactions in the CEO job market. As a result, we can endogenously determine the CEO's reservation utility. This allows us to explicitly analyze the precise relationship between the reservation utility and the aggregate state.
Our study is related, but complementary to Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b) . Both studies examine the impact of firms' interactions on the optimal incentive contracts. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b) study the impact of the product market competition on the CEO incentive contract in a two-firm static setting. However, this paper focuses on firms' interactions through the CEO's job market in a dynamic competitive setting. The dynamic nature of our model allows us to examine the optimal contract over time and provide a plausible explanation to the first inconsistency discussed earlier.
The current paper also shares the belief with Murphy and Zabojnik (2004a, 2004b ) that the CEO job market has become more important in determining the level of CEO pay. Different from our job matching and search method, they focus on differences between CEOs' firm-specific skills and general managerial skills as far as hiring is concerned. They further argue that general managerial skills become more important for the CEO jobs while firm-specific skills and knowledge become less so. As a result, there will be less internal and more external hiring.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and analyzes an individual firm's optimal compensation while taking other firms' contracts as given. Section 3 characterizes the market equilibrium, determines the optimal compensation polices and the CEO's 4 quitting probability, and discusses the empirical implications. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis while Section 5 concludes the paper. Proofs and tables are relegated in the Appendix.
An Individual Firm's Optimal Compensation Contract

Model Environment
Consider a discrete-time economy with many firms and many CEOs. We normalize the number of CEOs to be 1 and let the number of firms to be N. In each period, a CEO is either employed and producing or unemployed and searching, while a firm is either filled with a CEO or has a vacant CEO position. Each CEO is assumed to be effort aversion with a periodic utility function characterized by
where W is the CEO's total compensation and c is a positive constant measuring the CEO's aversion to effort e. Each firm is assumed to be risk-neutral. For a producing firm, its profit depends on the CEO's effort e, the match specific shock x (which is described later in details) and the aggregate shock y. For tractability, we use the following function for the profit:
Note that profits are correlated between firms through the aggregate shock. Each firm takes other firms' incentive contracts as given and chooses its own contract to maximize its expected residual value. As is standard in the contract literature, we assume that profits and the aggregate state of the economy are verifiable and contractable. In contrast, the effort level and the match-specific shocks are not verifiable, and so contracts cannot be made directly contingent on (e, x).
In this study, search is modelled in the way proposed by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) . To describe the search process, the timing of events in each period is illustrated in Figure 1 . At the beginning of each period, a firm with a vacant job position pays a hiring cost H to gain access to the job market which opens at the end of the period. This firm may be matched with an unemployed CEO in the next period by a matching function. For analytical tractability,
We adopt a matching function with constant returns to scale which takes the following form: For a firm with a filled CEO, it offers an incentive contract at the beginning of the period.
Then, a match-specific shock, x, occurs to the matched pair of firm and CEO, which is only observable to the CEO, but not to the firm. The CEO decides whether to accept the contract. If the shock, x, is favorable, the CEO accepts the contract. The aggregate shock, y, occurs after the CEO makes this choice. Upon observing the aggregate shock, the CEO then chooses the effort level to carry out production. He is paid according to the incentive contract at the end of the period. If the matching specific shock, x, is not favorable, the CEO will quit. In this case, he has to wait until the next period to search for a new job. While he waits for the job opportunity in the next period, he enjoys leisure and receives other benefits of unemployment. We summarize a CEO's utility of all benefits and leisure during unemployment as B. For firms whose CEOs just rejected their contracts, they also need to wait for the next period to recruit again.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that the match specific shock and the aggregate shock are i.i.d. across time and they are independent of each other. To simplify further, we assume that this match specific shock is uniformly distributed with an upper bound x and a lower bound x.
This implies a mean of μ x = x+x 2 and a standard deviation of
.
In this environment, we first analyze a single firm's optimal incentive contract, while taking other firms' contracts as given. Later, we analyze the equilibrium in the market.
Firm i's Optimal Incentive Contract
As said earlier, a contract can be made contingent on the firm's profit and the aggregate shock, but not on the CEO's effort and the match-specific shock. To examine the impact of an incentive contract on the equilibrium compensation and the CEO's quitting probability, we consider a standard linear contract which consists of a fixed salary and a profit sharing payment. Specifically,
where D ≡ (a, b) represents the contract which consists of a salary, a, and a profit sharing percentage, b.
Taking other firms' contracts as given, firm i chooses an optimal contract to maximize its expected profit after paying its CEO. The firm's optimization problem is solved in two steps.
First, we determine the CEO's best response to a contract. That is, given the contract, we determine the CEO's quitting decision as well as his optimal effort if he chooses to accept the contract. Second, given the CEO's decisions on quitting and effort, we solve for the firm's optimal contract. To this end, denote the value function of a CEO with a job as J E and the value function of an unemployed and searching CEO as J S . The Bellman equation for
where 0 denotes the variables in the next period, π = π(y, e, x) as described by (2.2) and β is the utility discount rate. 3 Similarly, the Bellman equation for the value function of the unemployed and searching CEO, J S , is
When choosing the effort level in (2.4), the CEO understands that profit depends on effort in the way described by (2.2). Given the incentive contract and (2.2), the optimal effort is e * (x, y) = by √ x/c. Intuitively, the optimal effort positively depends on the profit sharing b, the realized matching specific shock x and the aggregate shock y, negatively on the effort aversion coefficient c. However, the fixed salary a offers no incentive to induce effort. Since profit sharing is the only way to induce effort, we refer to the payment bπ as the effort-inducing payment.
Substituting the optimal effort into (2.4) and intergrating over y yields the precise value function for an employed CEO
The right-hand side of this equation is a monotone, contraction mapping for the function J E , of which J E is a fixed point. By the contraction mapping theorem (see Lucas . That is, the CEO's optimal participation decision obeys a reservation rule: he 3 Because JE is measured after the CEO observes the match specific shock and before y is realized, as shown in Figure 1 , it depends on the realization of the match specific shock and the contract, not on the aggregate shock y. Thus, we write an employed CEO's value function as J E (x, D).
accepts the contract if the firm specific shock x exceeds the reservation value x d (D), and quits
To express the reservation value explicitly, we denote the expected future value for a CEO
, conditional on the CEO accepts the offer this period. Note that I is taken as given by both the agent and the firm for the contracting problem in the current period, because it depends only on the future contract. Thus, the reservation value is
With the reservation rule, we can determine the CEO's participation probability as prob
x−x . Thus, the participation probability depends on the compensation D(a, b), because x d does. Given I and J S , the participation probability is higher if salary a or profit sharing ratio b is higher. Put it differently, increasing either element of the compensation can enhance the retention of the CEO. However, note that
∂b 2 > 0 and
∂a 2 = 0. Thus, the marginal benefit of increasing b on retention is diminishing while the marginal benefit of a on retention is constant.
We can put the above results on optimal retention together with the earlier result on optimal effort to predict some features of the optimal contract. Recall that the only way for a firm to induce high effort is to increase the profit sharing parameter, b. Because the effect of b in inducing retention diminishes at the margin, it seems optimal for the firm to use b primarily for inducing effort and to use a primarily for inducing retention at the margin.
Having characterized the CEO's optimal decisions, we now turn to the firm's choice of an optimal contract. Denote the value function of a firm with a filled position as J F and the value function of a hiring firm with a vacant CEO position as J H . Given the CEO's reservation rule, the value function J F obeys the following Bellman equation: 4
where
Similarly, for a firm whose job position is vacant at the beginning of the current period, the 4 Because the firm does not observe the match specific shock, x, these value functions are not function of x.
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value function J H obeys the following Bellman equation:
The optimal contract is a solution to the maximization problem in (2.8). When choosing the contract D = (a, b), the firm takes J H and the future values (J 0 H , J 0 F ) as given. More importantly, the firm anticipates that the CEO's effort (e * ) and quitting rule x d (D) will depend on the contract. The firm's optimal choices satisfy:
Putting the firm's optimal contract together with the CEO's optimal choices, we can determine 
Optimal Contracts in a Market Equilibrium
In the above analysis, we have taken as given the market conditions, such as the matching rates and future payoffs. To characterize a market equilibrium, we need to determine these market conditions. Let us start with the law of motion of the number of unemployed CEOs. As stated earlier, we normalize the number of CEOs to 1. In the current period, the number of unemployed
CEOs is u and the employed CEOs is 1 − u. Then the number of unemployed CEOs in the next
For simplicity, we focus on a stationary and symmetric market equilibrium, which consists of individual firms' choices (a, b), other firms' choices (a, b) and CEOs' choices (e * , x d ) such that the following requirements are satisfied:
(i) Given the firm's (a, b) and other firms' (a, b), the choices e * and x d for a CEO are optimal;
(ii) Given (a, b) and a CEO's best responses (e * , x d ) to (a, b), the firm's choices (a, b) are optimal;
(iii) The competitive entry of firms requires the benefit of hiring a CEO being equal to the cost of hiring. That is, βq(J 0 F − J 0 H ) = H, and hence J H = 0;
Based on the above definition, we solve for the equilibrium values of (a, b,
, and (q, θ) through a set of equations presented in the Appendix A. In particular, we show that there exists a unique non-zero solution for b * as long as the unemployment benefit is in the range of
Equilibrium Contract
Given the unique optimal solution b * , we can obtain equilibrium solution a * as
being the equilibrium value of the firm.
It is clear that the equilibrium salary increases with the size of the firm, which is similar to the result obtained by Gabaix and Landier (2007) 5 The result provides a plausible explanation to the steady increase in executive pay observed for the past three decades. It suggests that the steady increase in executive pay may be an efficient equilibrium response to the increase in the firm size which, in turn, is a result of the economic booming. In other words, during the past three decades, the economic booming has increased the sizes of all firms. In order to compete for CEOs in the job market, firms have to increase executives' salaries based on their sizes.
Appendix B.1 and B.2 provide the detailed comparative statics analysis for b * and a * which helps to establish the following proposition for the optimal incentive contract.
Proposition 3.1. In equilibrium, the optimal incentive contract has the following features:
1) The profit-sharing ratio, b, decreases with the expected aggregate state E(y), the systematic risk σ y , the utility discount rate β and the hiring cost H. It increases with the effort aversion coefficient c, the matching efficiency A and the unemployment benefit B. Also, b increases with the risk of the matching specific shock σ x when b < 2 3 , and undetermined otherwise.
2) The salary, a, is proportional to the value of the firm which, in turn, increases with the expected aggregate state E(y), the systematic risk σ y , the utility discount rate β and the hiring cost H. It decreases with the effort aversion coefficient c, the matching efficiency A and the unemployment benefit B. However, the effect of the matching specific risk σ x on the salary a is undetermined.
Since the profit-sharing payment serves as the role of effort-inducing (EI for short), we further examine the effort-inducing payment as a percentage of the total pay. Denote the ratio of the expected effort-inducing pay to the expected total pay as REI. It is easy to show
Therefore, a higher b will lead to a higher ratio of the effort-inducing payment relative to the total pay. Based on this relationship, the comparative statics analysis in Appendix B.3 leads to the following corollary:
The equilibrium ratio of the effort-inducing payment relative to the total pay (REI) decreases with the expected aggregate state E(y), the systematic risk σ y , the utility discount rate β and the hiring cost H. It increases with the effort-aversion coefficient c, the matching efficiency A, the unemployment benefit B, and the firm's idiosyncratic risk σ x when b < The intuitions for the equilibrium results in Proposition 3.1 and Corollary 3.2 are as follows:
1) When the expected aggregate shock, E(y), is high, firms have strong motivation to fill the CEO positions since their expected profits from production are high. In this case, the opportunity cost of leaving a vacant CEO position is high. To avoid this, firms have to offer high retentioninducing payments (i.e., the salary) and hence a low pay ratio b and a lower REI. The predicted positive relationship between the salary and the aggregate state provides a plausible explanation to the first inconsistency. In particular, the steady increase in executives' salary may be a result of firms' competing for CEOs in economic booming during the past three decades.
2) A firm's total risk is induced by the aggregate risk y and the firm-specific risk x. b is negatively affected by a firm's systematic risk, and positively affected by a firm's specific risk. 6 The reason is as follows. A CEO in the current model decides when to work for a firm. He only works for a firm when the realization of the match is high. With a bigger volatility for the matchspecific shock, the CEO takes advantage of the high realization of the match shock by working for the firm while avoiding the large downside realization by quitting. That is, the CEO's optimal decision ensures that the firm produces only if the realized match shock is high. In this sense, CEOs in the current model are similar to CEOs in Shi (2005) who can actively respond to risks.
Taken the match risk as a "respondable" idiosyncratic risk, the marginal benefit of increasing the profit sharing is higher than the marginal cost of increasing this ratio. Therefore, in equilibrium, the profit sharing increases with the firm's idiosyncratic (match) risk. On the other hand, the aggregate (systematic) risk is exogenous and CEOs take it as given. In order for firms to induce effort and at the same time to provide partial insurance to the risk-averse CEO, the firm should offer a lower pay-to-performance sensitivity with respect to a higher aggregate risk. 7 It is important to note that a traditional principal-agent model can only predict a negative relationship between firms' total risks and b * . Such a model is unable to distinguish opposite effects of the systematic risk and the firm-specific risk on the pay ratio b * . The different effects obtained in this paper are new to the existing literature, which can reconcile with the mixed empirical evidence on the relationship between b and firms' total risk.
3) When a CEO's effort-aversion coefficient, c, is high, firms need to offer a higher b to induce effort. This positive and yet intuitive relationship is in sharp contrast to the negative relationship obtained in the standard principal-agent model. This positive relationship arises in our model because a CEO's reservation utility is endogenous. A higher effort-aversion coefficient makes the endogenous reservation utility lower, which in turn indicates a higher b and a higher REI. 8 
4)
A higher utility discount rate, β makes a firm value the current production more and hence is more willing to offer a higher salary a to induce retention. As a result, the payout ratio b and REI are set lower levels.
5) A higher hiring cost, H, makes firms more willing to retain their CEOs. To achieve this, firms have to offer higher payments in salary a, and lower payout ratio b and lower REI.
6) A higher matching efficiency, A, makes hiring easier for firms, given the free entry condition.
As a result, firms tend to offer lower payments in salary to obtain the desirable retention, which, in turn, enable firms to offer a higher b and hence a higher REI.
7)
A higher unemployment benefit, B, makes an individual CEO more likely to enjoy leisure and shirk at work. The key issue now is to design a compensation package which can induce more effort from CEOs who are employed. To do so, firms have to offer a higher b and a higher REI. 9
Equilibrium Reservation Utility, Participation Probability and Job Duration for CEOs
Since the endogenized reservation utility is a special feature of the current model, we further investigate its equilibrium properties in this section. Given the equilibrium incentive contract discussed above, we can establish the following proposition which summarizes the impacts of the exogenous variables on the endogenous reservation utility (please refer to the detailed comparative statics analysis in Appendix C.1).
Proposition 3.3. The equilibrium reservation utility increases with the expected aggregate state E(y), the firm's systematic risk σ y , the utility discount rate β and the hiring cost H. It also decreases with the effort-aversion coefficient c, the matching efficiency A and the unemployment benefit B. However, the effect of the matching specific risk σ x on the reservation utility is undetermined.
The positive relationship between the reservation utility and the expected aggregate state in Proposition 3.3 is intuitive and offers theoretical support to the assumed relationship between the exogenous reservation utility and the aggregate state used by Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000) and Oyer (2004) . The intuitions for other relationships described in the above proposition can be easily obtained based on the intuitions provided for the optimal incentive contracts in the previous subsection.
Now we turn our attention to the equilibrium participation probability. As shown earlier, the participation probability is 1
x−x , which solely depends on the CEO's reservation rule. The equilibrium properties of the participation probability are presented in the following proposition (please refer to Appendix C.2 for detailed comparative statics analysis).
Proposition 3.4. The equilibrium participation probability, 1 − F (x d ), increases with the expected aggregate state E(y), the systematic risk σ y , the utility discount rate β and the hiring cost H. It decreases with the effort aversion coefficient c, the matching efficiency A, the unemployment benefit B and the idiosyncratic match risk σ x when b < Given the CEO's equilibrium participation behavior, we can further investigate the job duration for a CEO. Following the standard definition, we define the average job duration as the reciprocal of the probability of job separation where job separation includes quitting and firing.
Since we don't explicitly model firms' firing decisions, we therefore can only examine the marginal influence of the quitting probability on the job duration. That is, by fixing the probability of firing, we analyze how the job duration is affected by the exogenous factors through CEO's 15 quitting probability. The negative relationship between the average job duration and the quitting probability implies a positive relationship between the average job duration and the participation probability, which leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 3.5. In equilibrium, the average job duration increases with the expected aggregate state E(y), the systematic risk σ y , the utility discount rate β and the hiring cost H. It decreases with the effort aversion coefficient c, the matching efficiency A, the unemployment benefit B and the idiosyncratic match risk σ x when b < The intuitions for the results in the above proposition and corollary can be obtained based on the intuitions provided for the optimal incentive contracts.
In the next section, we empirically test the results presented in Propositions 3.1 and Corollary 3.2. Given the limitation of the data as well as our focus on the two stylized inconsistencies related to the executive compensation practice, we will conduct empirical tests for the following three 
Empirical Evidence
Data
The executive compensation data are retrieved from the ExecuComp of Compustat database, which provides compensations and returns data for publicly traded firms from 1992 to 2005. Asdiscussed in Murphy (1999), a typical compensation package includes salary, bonus, long-term payouts, restricted stock and option grants. To test the three implications listed earlier, we need to identify the empirical measures for the pay-to-performance sensitivity ratio b, salary a and REI.
To obtain b, we follow the standard practice in the literature and calculate b as the change in the value of equity compensation with respect to $1000 change in shareholders' wealth, where the sum of stock and option grants is regarded as the incentive payment since they reward executives based on firms' own performance. 10 The salary a is set to be the salary paid to executives in practice. The ratio REI is calculated as the ratio between the equity-based pay and the total annual compensation.
To conduct the tests for the three implications, we need to formulate four major explanatory variables. Precisely, we need to determine the aggregate state, a CEO's degree of effort aversion, a firm's specific risk and its systematic risk. Following standard practice, we use the GDP growth or commercial paper spread to proxy the aggregate state. To quantify firms' specific and systematic risks, we use two different measures: one used by Core and Guay (1999) , and the other by Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b) . In particular, we first obtain each firm's stock return volatility using 60 monthly return observations prior to the fiscal year. We then obtain the firm's beta from the market model using the same set of monthly return data. A firm's systematic risk is equal to beta multiplied by the stock market risk, while the firm's specific risk is the square root of the difference between the total return variance and the firm's systematic risk variance. This is the risk measure used by Core and Guay (1999) . The risk measure used in Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b) is obtained by multiplying its stock return volatility to its market capitalization. Then the firm's total risk measure is the rank based on its total dollar risk. A firm's systematic or non-systematic risk is obtained in the same way.
Like many existing studies, we exclude all financial firms and utility firms whose SIC codes range between 6000 and 6999, and between 4900 and 4999, respectively. Our final sample consists of 10,837 firm-years with 2432 firms and 4010 executives for the period of 1992 to 2005. Table 1 provides the summary statistics for executive compensations, characteristics of firms and CEOs, and the macroeconomic variables representing the aggregate state. The average salary in Panel A is about $627,000 per year, which is almost equal to the average bonus $673,000 per year. However, the median annual salary $572,000 is much higher than that of the bonus $375,000, indicating that bonus payment are more skewed toward the high end. This feature is also confirmed by other statistics for bonus. The average long-term incentive pay is about $181,000 per year, slightly less than one-third of the average annual salary. However, 75% of firms in the sample do not provide long-term incentive pay. 14 The average new equity incentives for a fiscal year is $2.10 with respect to the $1000 change in shareholders' wealth, compared to the average total equity incentives $27.56. The average percentage of effort-inducing pay relative to total pay is 45%. In other words, firms use slightly less than a half of the total pay to induce executives' effort.
The average CEO is about 56 years old and stays with one firm for slightly over 8 years. The youngest CEO is 29 years old while the oldest is 90. The longest job duration is 38 years, in contrast to the shortest job duration of 5 months.
The summary statistics of firms' characteristics suggest that firms in the sample are skewed towards large end. In particular, the average firm equity value is $6,762 million, almost six times as large as the corresponding median value $1,196 million. The average annual sales is $4,042 million, almost four times as large as the median sales $1,141 million. The average firm return volatility is 45%, which is slightly higher than the median 39%. The average systematic firm return volatility is 15%, about one-third of the average total return volatility.
During the sample period of 1992 to 2005, the average GDP growth rate in the U.S. is 5%, compared to the minimum 3% and maximum 7%. On the other hand, the commercial paper spread is much more volatile. The commercial paper spread is averaged at 23 basis points with a 12 basis points as the standard deviation. Table 2 provide the correlations among the explanatory variables. It is easy to see that the commercial paper spread is positively correlated with the GDP growth with a correlation of 0.16. All other correlations among the explanatory variables in our analysis are very small, with exceptions for correlations among the dollar risks and the firm size which is proxied by log(sales).
In particular, the firm size is highly correlated with the total firm dollar risk, its systematic and specific dollar risks with correlations being 0.68, 0.68 and 0.67, respectively. Also, the correlation between the total dollar risk and the systematic (specific) dollar risk is 0.93 (0.92). Therefore, for all regressions involving these risk measures as the explanatory variables, we need to interpret the results with caution.
Test of Implication 1 on Pay-to-Performance Sensitivity
In this section, we empirically examine how the pay-to-performance sensitivity b is affected by the aggregate state, firms' risks and other firm characteristics. Since b is less than with the firm's idiosyncratic risk, as predicted by the current model. To test these implications, we run the following regression: where the aggregate state is separately proxied by the GDP growth, or the negative commercial paper (hereafter NCP) spread 15 and |CEO age−60| is used to proxy the degree of effort aversion.
In addition, we also include other control variables. In particular, following the existing literature, we include the CEO tenure, firm size and firm growth which is proxied by sales growth. This regression is performed with the OLS and median regressions. The reason to use the median regression is to reduce the impact of outliers since the compensation data is the skewed towards large firms.
Test of Implication 1 on Pay-to-Performance Sensitivity when Firm Risk is Measured by Stock Return Volatility
In this subsection, we test Implication 1 by using the stock return volatility as the risk measure.
Panel A of Table 3 presents the results of the OLS and median regression using the current equity grants to compute b, while Panel B of Table 3 presents the corresponding results using the cumulative equity grants to compute b. The main findings are as follows.
1. Whether the GDP or commercial paper spread is used to represent the aggregate state, the R 20 s are similar. This suggests that the GDP and commercial paper spread are equally good proxies for the aggregate state. 
4.
OLS and median regressions confirm a positive relationship between b and the effort aversion and all coefficients are significant at 1% level.
5.
To contrast our predictions with those of a standard principal-agent model, we run the regression (4.1) by replacing the firm's "specific risk" and "systematic risk" with the firm's "total risk". For brevity, we only report the coefficient for the firm's "total risk" and the corresponding R 2 . In general, the R 2 with the firm's total risk" as an explanatory variable is smaller than that obtained from regression in (4.1), indicating that b is better explained by separating the firm's systematic risk from its specific risk. More importantly, the relationship between b and firms' total risks is positively and significant at 1% level 21 when b is computed from the current equity grant for both types of regressions. However, the coefficients are mostly positive and significant at 5% level under median regressions when b is computed from the total equity grant. This positive relationship is opposite to the predicted negative relationship from the standard principal-agent model. Therefore, we conclude that the negative (positive) relationship between b and the firm's systematic (non-systematic) risks is strongly supported by our empirical evidence.
Test of Implication 1 on Pay-to-Performance Sensitivity when Firm Risk is Measured by Dollar Risk
In this subsection, we test Implication 1 on b using the risk measure in Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b) . Precisely, a firm's risk measure is equal to the rank assigned based its dollar risk.
We run the regression in equation (4.1) and present the results in Table 4 . Not surprisingly, the regressions with firms' total risks confirm the empirical results presented in Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b) (please refer to the last three rows in Table 4 ). That is, the coefficients for firms' total risks are all negative and significant at 1% level in Panels A and B.
More importantly, the results in Table 4 for the aggregate state and firms' systematic risks are similar to those in Table 3 . That is, OLS and median regressions confirm a negative relationship between b and the aggregate state, as well as a negative relationship between b and firms' systematic risks. However, the coefficients for firms' specific risks are negative which is opposite to the predicated positive sign. Nevertheless, most of them are insignificant. Therefore, it is fair to say that the predicted positive influence of firms' specific risk on b is neither supported nor rejected when the dollar risk measure is used.
It is worth to state two caveats. First, we should interpret the results in Table 4 with caution since the correlations among firm size, firms' systematic risks and firms' specific risk are very high (please see Table 2 ). Second, the stock return volatility is a more proper risk measure in the current setting since the profit of a firm is determined by the product of the aggregate variable and the firm specific variable, as opposite to the profit in Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b) whose unit measure is the same as the unit measure of the risk.
Test of Implication 2 on Salary
In this section, we empirically document how salary a is affected by the size of the firm, the aggregate state, firms' risks and other firm characteristics. Based on Proposition 3.1, we anticipate that salary increases with the size of the firm, the aggregate state and the firm's systematic risks, and decreases with the product of the firm size and the firm's idiosyncratic risk. To test these implications, we run the following regression:
log(Salary) = a 1 + a 2 (GDP/NCP spread) + a 3 Firm Specific Risk +a 4 Firm Systematic Risk + a 5 |CEO age − 60| + a 6 Firm Size + a 7 Firm size × Firm Risk Specific+ a 8 Tenure + a 9 Firm Growth + ε,
Given the two caveats stated earlier, we only report the results in Table 5 using the stock return volatilities as the firms' risks. Panel A of Table 5 presents the results of the OLS and median regression using only salary. For Panel B, we replace salary with the sum of salary, bonus and long-term incentive payouts. This sum represents the non-equity (incentive) payment made to CEOs. A few observations are in order.
1.
OLS and median regressions confirm a positive relationship between a and the firm size and all coefficients are significant at 1% level.
2. Both in Panels A and B, all regressions confirm a positive relationship between salary (or non-equity payment) and the aggregate state. The coefficients for NCP spread are all significant at 1% level. When the GDP is the proxy for the aggregate state, the coefficients are significant at 1% for non-equity payment, insignificant for salary.
3. OLS and median regressions yield a negative relationship between fixed salary (non-equity payment) and firms' systematic risks, contradicting to the predicted positive relationship.
Nevertheless, majority of the coefficients are insignificant, indicating that our theoretical prediction is neither supported nor rejected by the empirical evidence.
4.
OLS and median regressions confirm a negative relationship between a and the effort aversion and all coefficients are significant at 1% level.
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5. The current model doesn't predict a unique relationship between salary (non-equity payment) and firms' specific risk. However, the empirical evidence shows a strong positive relationship. This strong positive influence may be the driving force for the positive relationship between salary (non-equity pay) and firms' total risk, as shown in the last three rows. Five out of the eight coefficients are significant at 1% level.
To summarize, our empirical evidence confirms a predicted positive relationship between the aggregate state and salary (or non-equity payment). Our model suggests that the increased salary is a result of firms wanting being competitive in the CEO job market in a growing economic environment, and hence it provides a plausible explanation to the long-standing puzzle on the steady increase in CEOs salary during the past thirty years in the U.S..
Test of Implication 3 on Percentage of Total Pay Used to Induce Effort
Corollary 3.2 summarizes the predictions on the percentage of the total pay used to induce CEO's effort. These predictions are new to the existing literature and hence offer new insights to the traditional principal-agent model. In particular, the percentage of the total pay used to induce effort decreases with the aggregate state and the firm's systematic risk, and increases with the firm's idiosyncratic risk. To test this implication, we compute REI as the ratio between the equity-based pay and the total compensation. To reflect the impact of other features of a firm, we include CEOs' tenure, firm size and firm growth in the regression. To deal with the nonlinearity in REI, we use log( 1 1−REI ) as the dependent variable. 16 The regression is specified as:
Again, we only report the results with the stock return volatility as the risk measure in Table 6 . First, OLS and median regressions confirm the predicted negative relationship between REI and the aggregate state and all coefficients are negative and significant at 1% confidence level. Second, OLS and median regression confirm the predicted positive (negative) relationship 16 We thank Douglas Cumming for this suggestion.
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between REI and firms' specific (systematic) risks. All coefficients are significant at 1% level.
Third, OLS and median regressions confirm a positive relationship between REI and the effort aversion and all coefficients are significant at 1% level. Furthermore, we run the above regression by replacing the firm "specific risk" and "systematic risk" with the firm "total risk". OLS and median regressions show a strong negative and significant relationship between REI and firms' total risk.
To summarize, the empirical results in Table 6 provide full and strong support to our theoretical predictions of the aggregate state, firms' systematic risks and firms' specific risks on the percentage of total pay used to induce retention.
Conclusion
As pointed out by Oyer (2004) , much of the agency literature has concentrated on inducing optimal effort while little attention has been paid to the participation constraint. This paper is aimed at filling this gap. We study the incentive compensation contract for CEOs which not only provides incentives to induce effort, but also provides incentives to retain/attract CEOs.
To do so, we construct a dynamic equilibrium model where firms strategically interact/compete in the CEO job market. That is, firms and CEOs search for matches in the labor market. In each period, a firm offers a compensation package and the CEO decides whether to accept the contract. The CEO quits only if his outside option exceeds the utility he can derive from the compensation. The value of a job that a CEO can find in the marketplace is determined by other firms' compensation schemes. Thus, a CEO's reservation utility is endogenously determined in equilibrium. The contract offered by one firm depends on other firms' contracts through the CEO's outside options. Because of this link among different firms' contracts, we determine all firms' contracts in as stationary equilibrium.
Our equilibrium analysis yields a few new and important results which can explain two longstanding puzzles concerning executive compensations. In particular, the equilibrium salary depends on the firm's size, which, in turn, increases with the expected aggregate state. This result provides a plausible explanation to the steadily increased salary paid to executives during the past 25 three decades. Second, the equilibrium pay-to-performance-sensitivity negatively depends on the expected aggregate state and a firm's systematic risk, and positively on the firm's specific risk.
The separate effects of firms' systematic and specific risks on the pay-to-performance-sensitivity offers a possible theory to reconcile with the mixed empirical evidence on the relationship between the pay-to-performance-sensitivity and firms' total risk. Third, firms use the total pay (i.e., the salary and performance-based pay) as incentive devices to retain or attract CEOs, in response to their endogenous reservation utilities. Salary acts as an insurance to effort-averse CEOs while the profit sharing pay provides incentives to induce effort. the total compensation acts as the incentive device to retain/attract CEOs, in response to the endogenous reservation utilities while the profit/ownership sharing offers incentives to induce effort. Fourth, our equilibrium analysis
shows that the percentage of the total pay to induce effort also decreases with the expected aggregate state and the firm's systematic risk and increases with the firm's idiosyncratic risk. Last, CEOs' retention probabilities and job durations are positively affected by the firm's systematic risk and the expected aggregate state, and negatively affected by the firm's specific risk.
These equilibrium predictions are largely supported by the our extensive empirical evidence on salary, the pay-to-performance sensitivity and the percentage of total pay used to induce effort.
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First, we find the expressions for I and J S based on J E . To do so, we work with equations (6),
. Putting Equation (7) into the expression for I, together with equation (6), we solve for J S and I and further compute
After simplifying equation (3), we obtain
Substituting the free entry condition in equation (9) into equation (5), we have
Using equation (10) to simplify equation (5), we obtain
Note that equations (A.1) and (A.2) only involve b and θ. Therefore, we can solve for both. Once the optimal value for b is obtained, all other equilibrium outcomes as such a and x d are solved since they are only functions of b.
To solve for b, we obtain an expression for θ from (A.2) and put it into (A.1). This yields the following equation which only involves b:
x, the admissible b belongs to (0.5, 1). Therefore, we can show that
This quadratic function reaches its minimum at − Given 0 < β < 1 and 0 < A < 2, we can easily show that
with reasonable parameters for σ x and x and G " (b = 1) = 2β We can further show that
Given this, we obtain
x ), whose sign is undetermined. Hence, there are two possibilities to graph G 0 (b):
It is easy to show that 3)
∂G/∂b
and undetermined other wise.
B.2. Fixed Salary
In equilibrium, the fixed salary a is
It is easy to show that
3)
| b=b * undetermined.
B.3. REI
We know that
Thus, it is easy to show the following results.
1)
C. Comparative Statics for CEO's Reservation Utility and Participation
C.1. CEO's Reservation Utility
The equilibrium reservation utility is
We can show that ∂J S ∂b | b=b * < 0, which leads to the following results.
1)
2´u ndetermined.
C.2. CEO's Participation Probability
The equilibrium participation probability is
Thus, we can easily show the following results.
1)
and undetermined other wise. Notes:
1. The fixed salary is the salary paid to executives. Firm risk is measured by the stock return volatility. The number of observations is 10837. 2. We control for industry-fixed effects in all regressions. For OLS, standard errors are clustered at firm level. For median regressions, standard errors are calculated by bootstrapping with 20 replications. Robust t statistics are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 3. We also run the regression by replacing firms "Specific" and "Systematic" Risk with "Total Risk". The coefficient and t-value for "Total Risk" are shown in the last two rows. 
